Recepción y "crítica inmanente" de Heidegger de la fenomenología husserliana

Abstract

At the beginning of Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Gesamtausgabe, volume 20), Heidegger extensively puts forward his views against phenomenology, especially that of Husserl, which is the one we are going to consider. By means of what he calls the "fundamental discoveries of phenomenology", that is, intentionality, categorial intuition and the meaning of the a priori in Husserl's Logical Investigations, Heidegger reaches a definition of phenomenology: "The analytic description of intentionality in its a priori'. Next, Heidegger proceeds to what he characterizes as an "immanent critique" of phenomenology, that consists in highlighting that in Ideas Husserl does make but omits the fundamental question on "the being of consciousness" and on "the sense of being", in a way that ends up in being un-phenomenological. We go into Heidegger's text in order to consider the legitimacy of its critique and, particularly, its alleged immanence.