Brentano et la théorie réaliste de la vérité
Abstract
The author deals with the Brentanian theory of truth, as it is sketched in Ueber den Begriff der Wahrheit (1889). He shows how, although entrenched in a deep sense of "real", this theory moves away from the traditionally to realism assigned "correspondence theory". Following Brentano and carrying out a systematic comparison of his views to Austin's ones, he investigates how far, in fact, a strict realism is incompatible with any kind of "correspondence theory". On the other side, he tries to make sorne sense of the ide a of a truth as "adequacy".
Published
2004-04-01
How to Cite
BENOIST, Jocelyn.
Brentano et la théorie réaliste de la vérité.
Phainomenon, [S.l.], n. 8, p. 9-29, apr. 2004.
ISSN 2183-0142.
Available at: <http://phainomenon-journal.pt/index.php/phainomenon/article/view/4>. Date accessed: 06 oct. 2024.
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