Délire et hallucination dans la schizophrénie : une perspective phénoménologique
The present paper reflects on hallucination and delusion in schizophrenia from a phenomenological perspective. The paper’s aim is to understand the relationship of hallucination and delusion within the theoretical paradigm of schizophrenia as a self-disorder. Drawing on fundamental insights from contemporary phenomenological research by Louis A. Sass, Josef Parnas and Thomas Fuchs, I try to understand in which way delusion and hallucination are understandable from the backdrop of their account. The argument begins with current definitions of hallucination and schizophrenia in the DSM-5. I will critically illuminate these definitions by key thinkers of phenomenological psychopathology (or close to it), such as Karl Jaspers, Eugène Minkowski, Henri Ey and Merleau-Ponty. The paper’s main challenge is to understand hallucination and delusion beyond their respective alignment with perception (as though hallucination would simply be a perception without an object to perceptive) or false belief (as if delusion would simply be an absurd conviction). In opposition to such these accounts, I will try to analyze the concrete experience of both symptoms. This will lead me to put forth a fundamental affective dimension in both delusion and hallucination.