Sobre los límites del lenguaje y las limitaciones de la fenomenología
Taking as a point of departure José Gaos' claim, most likely directed to Phenomenology, that every true philosophy should produce a theory of what is sayable and what is unsayable, I try to circumscribe, from Phenomenology, and specifically from Husserl's analysis of linguistic expression in Ideas I, an essential unsayability (or ineffability), as a precise limit oflanguage. This limit is brought about by the generality of expression. After a brief historical review, and a exposition of José Vasconcelos' idea of an "inverted epojé' as a way to avoid the generalizations of language, the limit between the sayable and the unsayable is found in the distinction between the noematic nucleus of an act and its full noema, which supports its individuality. As a corollary of this exposition, it is shown that what is ineffable is life itself, as it is concretely lived. On this basis, it is proposed a phenomenological critique of language, according to which a phenomenology of language must be supported by a phenomenológy of life in its ineffable plenitude.