A recepção das "Investigações lógicas" por Paul Natorp
The paper offers a survey of the debate between Husserl and Paul Natorp that followed the publication, by the forrner, of Logical lnvestigations, in 1900-1901. Beyond a general agreement on the nature of psychologism and the ways to struggle against it, Husserl and Natorp disagreed, at the time, on the nature and function of consciousness. As Natorp defended, since his lntroduction to Psychology of 1888, that the objective contents of consciousness are distinct from the I as the subjective (and unobjectifiable) point of reference of them alL, Husserl remarks the inner contradiction of these argument; as long as philosophy pretends to speak of such an I it has to be treated as an object, albeit of a special kind. ln the Logical lnvestigations, nevertheless, Husserl stresses that it is not even necessary to admit the existence of such an I to explain the acts of consciousness. However, and that is the central theme of the paper, the later evolution of Husserl's thought and finally his "transcendental turn" can only be fully comprehensible from the admission of a strong influence ofthe previous criticized thesis of Natorp.