Caracteres da experiência

  • André Barata


The discrimination between two points of view, or perspectives, in respect to consciousness, one on the first-person other on the third-person, deals with two concepts of consciousness — respectively, phenomenal consciousness and intentional consciousness (sections 1 and 2). I will accept, generally, this idea. However, I will argue that are not two, but three kinds of consciousness and typ of experience, making my point introducing the concept of different characters of experience (section 3). These characters are 'experience', 'signification' and 'reference/object', and when ali of them occur I say that we have an intentional experience. If it lacks the last one, we have a meaningful experience, but without reference. Finally, if the only occurrence is 'experience', then the type of experience we live is a meaningless or mute experience. This 'taxonomy' allows classifying a perceptum as an intentional experience, a quale as a meaningful experience and a sense datum as a mute experience. On the other hand, it represents, as I claim, an approach much more clear, than those usually appears, to the question 'what qualia really are? (sections 4 e 5). Moreover: it makes possible talk about objectivity of qualia, an objectivity without object (section 6).

How to Cite
BARATA, André. Caracteres da experiência. Phainomenon, [S.l.], n. 2, p. 5-36, apr. 2001. ISSN 2183-0142. Available at: <>. Date accessed: 22 june 2018.

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